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Abstract—We introduce a study examining people’s privacy concerns in a time of Covid-19 and
we reflect on people’s willingness to share their personal data in the interest of controlling the
spread of the virus and save lives.
The significant growth in the number of users
with mobile phones as well as the adoption of key
enabling technologies like cloud computing has
led to the creation of an entire tracking ecosystem
that could enable the use of pervasive surveillance
methods. However, this development also brings
serious privacy concerns, as current governance
and regulation frameworks are lagging behind
these technological advancements. This is visible
in the current pandemic, where concerns around
privacy and civil liberties have led several coun-
tries to respond differently in their approach of
controlling the spread of Covid-19 and preserve
human life.
This article aims to answer the following
questions: (1) What is the general attitude towards
privacy in a time of Covid-19? (2) Has this atti-
tude changed compared to normal circumstances
with the desire to help control the spread of
Covid-19? (3) Do privacy concerns prevent peo-
ple from using technologies (e.g. COVID Tracker
app) that may help in managing the crisis? (4) Are
people concerned about the long term influence
of these technologies (beyond the health crisis)
on their privacy? To answer our questions, we
conducted a case study in the Republic of Ireland
and a questionnaire was distributed online at
a national level. The survey was created using
Google Forms. Data collected is covered by the
Dublin City University Google Apps agreement
which includes data protection assurances. The
survey has been approved by the National Re-
search Ethics Committee of the Health Research
Board in Ireland. We report here the results of
this national survey that collected 1001 effective
responses from 1012 participants.
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Our main finding is that there is a significant
shift in the attitude of the Irish population towards
privacy during the pandemic.
Privacy and Health Data
Although no-one has examined whether pri-
vacy attitudes towards personal health data
change during a pandemic, a time when the trade-
off between risks and benefits is dramatically
accentuated, the literature does provide guidance
as to the nature of data privacy concerns and
how they can motivate behavior. For example,
attention has been paid to understanding how data
privacy concerns influence technology adoption
behaviors in relation to a number of health ar-
tifacts, ranging from examinations of electronic
health record adoption to wearable healthcare
devices. A consistent motif throughout this lit-
erature is that privacy dilemmas in relation to
health information are unique, as the risk asso-
ciated with its disclosure are distinctive both in
nature and variety. For example, the disclosure
decision is characterized by a high level of risk
and uncertainty regarding collection, secondary
usage, errors, improper access, control and aware-
ness of personal health information [2]. As a
consequence, theoretical stances employed in the
information privacy literature [3] tend towards
a cognitive and consequentialist emphasis where
individuals weigh up the costs and benefits asso-
ciated with a behavior. Much reliance has been
placed on expectancy theory which proposes that
the individual is motivated to choose a particular
action based on their evaluation of the desirability
of positive outcomes resulting from that behavior.
Decisions then result from engaging in this cogni-
tive assessment of how likely the expected results
of a behavior will result in the desired positive
outcome, known as a valence. In a data privacy
context, this assessment is known as the privacy
calculus and it proposes that the intention to
disclose is influenced by the balancing of poten-
tial privacy concerns with information disclosure
benefits. Although this model has been widely
used [4], it contains limitations as the evaluation
of expected risks and benefits associated with
information disclosure have been shown to differ
according to context and it also neglects the re-
lationship between information privacy concerns
and their antecedents. In this study, we identify
the factors influencing data privacy concerns in
relation to a tracking app specific to the context
of a pandemic.
Data Privacy in Contact-Tracing Apps
In the current Covid-19 global pandemic envi-
ronment, a proliferation of contact-tracing appli-
cations has been developed, the success of which
relies on obtaining access to citizen’s mobile
phone GPS location and other personal data.
While some countries have adopted a forced mass
surveillance method that limits individual free-
doms, other countries with a strong democratic
and civil liberty ethos are encouraging voluntary
adoption of contact-tracing applications by their
citizens. This requires that a large proportion of
the population consent to sharing location and
other personal data in order to improve tracking
and suppress spread of the virus. As a result, the
pandemic is testing attitudes towards privacy and
government surveillance.
Consequently, in an attempt to overcome se-
curity and privacy concerns, various Covid-19
tracing apps have adopted different architectures
for data collection. These architectures are pre-
dominantly classified into two categories [5], [6]:
(1) centralized, and (2) decentralized. The clas-
sification is determined by the way in which the
server is used and the type and location of the
data collected as seen in Figure 1.
Within the centralized architecture most of
the information is stored and processed on a
centralized cloud server. In this approach, the
cloud server plays a key role by storing pseudony-
mous users’ personal information, performing
risk analysis and sending out notifications to close
contacts in case of infection. Consequently, this
raises security and privacy concerns regarding
the use and the life cycle of the data collected
especially should the cloud server become an un-
trustable entity. However, the information stored
on the centralized server can be employed for data
analysis that could help the government when
making decisions regarding lockdown restrictions
in hot-spot areas.
In a decentralized architecture, the core func-
tions are moved to user devices, which results in
involvement of the centralised server within the
contact tracing process being drastically reduced.
This approach tries to enhance user privacy by
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Figure 1. Centralized vs. Decentralized Approach of
Contact Tracing Apps
performing the tracing process locally on the
user’s device. Contact tracing apps that are based
on the decentralized approach do not require the
users to pre-register prior to use and as conse-
quence, no personal identifiable information is
stored on the server. Any device running the app
will generate privacy-preserving pseudonyms that
are exchanged periodically between the devices
that come in close contact. The central cloud
server in this scenario acts as a rendezvous point
for lookup purposes where the infected user can
volunteer to upload their relevant time informa-
tion which reflects only their individual trajectory
and does not include any information about the
encounters. Other app users can regularly access
this type of information from the central server,
using it locally on their devices for risk analysis
purposes, to check if they have been exposed to
the virus and for how long. Even though this
approach alleviates some of the privacy risks, no
information is stored on the central server for data
analysis purposes that could help the government
when making decisions regarding lockdown re-
strictions in exposed hot-spot areas.
Overview of Contact Tracing Apps
In terms of the technology being used, both
the centralized and decentralized approaches pre-
dominantly rely on Bluetooth, Global Positioning
System (GPS), Quick Response (QR) codes and
cellular location tracking [7]. A summary of the
contact tracing apps adopted by different coun-
tries around the world, including their names and
their corresponding technologies is illustrated in
Figure 2.
However, regardless of the technology being
used, the main technical requirements of any
contact tracing app is that it must operate at
close range in order to be able to determine with
high accuracy if a person has been within the
2m proximity of an infected individual. While
GPS is capable of providing accurate location
information between 10 to 20 meters only, cel-
lular location data is even less precise and con-
tributes to significant privacy concerns regarding
the violation of citizens’ data protection rights.
Consequently, most contact tracing apps rely on
Bluetooth which operates at close range and has
a reasonable accuracy within the 2m proximity.
More importantly, the individual remains in con-
trol and can decide whether to opt in or out
by switching the Bluetooth function on or off.
As seen in Figure 2, most countries rely on
Bluetooth as the best choice regardless of the
approach implemented.
Countries like France, Australia, Singapore,
New Zealand, Norway, India, Mexico, Qatar,
Kuwait, Bahrain, Hungary, Bulgaria, Tunisia have
opted for centralized approaches. The centralized
apps mainly follow the PEPP-PT (Pan-European
Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing) protocol
[8]. Most of the centralized approaches combined
Bluetooth with location information to improve
the accuracy. However, in Norway the Data Pro-
tection Authority has suspended the app on the
grounds that poses a significant threat to user
privacy by continuously uploading individuals’
location information. In the UK a centralized
approach was initially adopted, but due to privacy
concerns and mobile devices battery drainage,
a switch was made to decentralized solution.
Belgium, Switzerland, Finland, Estonia adopted
the decentralized approach that follows the DP-
3T (Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity
Tracing) [9] which is seen as a partially de-
centralized solution as it uses an anonymous
centralized database for the infected individual.
However, the identification of a specific indi-
vidual is not possible through the type of data
collected and exchanged. Recently, most of the
countries adopted the decentralized approach that
relies on the cross-platform API developed by
Google and Apple [10]. However, despite the
2021 3
Figure 2. Centralized vs. Decentralized Contact-Tracing App Approaches Around the World and Technologies
Involved
improvements around privacy and security, there
are still concerns that Google/Apple could end
up controlling the EU’s Covid-19 app ecosystem.
For example, in Ireland Health Service Executive
(HSE) addressed the privacy issues of their Covid
Tracker app by making the assessment on data
protection impact of the app available to the
public, and the source code of the app was also
made open source. However, the Irish Council for
Civil Liberties raised privacy concerns due to the
lack of transparency from Apple and Google’s
side in terms of their involvement in the tracker
app.
Despite all the efforts across the world, it is
obvious that finding the balance between the po-
tential benefits of an effective technology-based
contact tracing app and the data protection and
privacy of individuals remains a challenge.
Attitudes to Privacy in a Time of
COVID-19
Since privacy concerns drive the technical
requirements for many tracing apps, it is vital to
understand the public’s views on privacy. Conse-
quently, we conducted a study to investigate the
attitudes to privacy of the residents of Ireland
during Covid-19 times. The study is based on
an anonymous questionnaire that was distributed
online over the main channels at national level
during 12th Nov. 2020 and 12th Jan. 2021. The
questionnaire is structured in three parts: (1)
demographic data collection following the guide-
lines from [11]; (2) set of questions to model
the general privacy profiles based on the Privacy
Segmentation Index (PSI) [12]; and (3) questions
that aim to capture the attitude towards privacy
in times of Covid-19.
Of all 1001 participants, 489 (48.85%) are
male and 490 (48.95%) are female, 18 people
choose preferring not to say and 4 people choose
Non binary. The largest age group is between
25-44 years old with 503 participants which ac-
count 50.0% of total. Regarding the participants’
location, most of the participants (62.3%) come
from county Dublin. The remaining 37.7% of
the participants are distributed among the rest of
the counties. The participants are well-educated,
with 30.3% owning a Master’s degree, 22.2% a
Bachelor’s degree and 16.8% finished secondary
school. The participants sample seems to be a
good representation of the Irish population and
in line with the 2016 Census data [13]. However,
it is worth acknowledging that the participants’
characteristics within the sample might limit the
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generalization of the results.
General Privacy Profiles
To identify the general privacy profile of each
participant, we introduced three statements in the
second part of the questionnaire, as follows:
1) Consumers have lost all control over how
personal information is collected and used
by companies;
2) Most businesses handle the personal infor-
mation they collect about consumers in a
proper and confidential way;
3) Existing laws and organizational practices
provide a reasonable level of protection for
consumer privacy today.
The participants could rate them between Strongly
Disagree to Strongly Agree on a four-point scale.
Based on their response to these statements, we
classified the participants into three groups: (a)
privacy fundamentalists, representing individuals
that are at the maximum extreme of the privacy
concern and the most protective of their privacy;
(b) privacy pragmatists, a grouping that repre-
sents those individuals who weigh up the pros
and cons of information sharing before making
a decision to share their personal information;
and finally (c) the privacy unconcerned, a group
representing those individuals who are least pro-
tective of their privacy. In line with Westin’s
classification [12] participants who agreed with
statement 1 and disagreed with statements 2 and
3 were profiled as privacy fundamentalists. Partic-
ipants who disagreed with statement 1 but agreed
with statements 2 and 3 were profiled as privacy
unconcerned, while the rest of the participants
were profiled as privacy pragmatists.
The results of the general privacy profiles of
the participants in our national questionnaire in-
dicate that 29% of participants were privacy fun-
damentalists, 54% were privacy pragmatists and
17% were privacy unconcerned. These results are
consistent with the results of previous Westin’s
surveys which indicated that the majority of the
participants were privacy pragmatists [12].
Privacy Attitudes in a Time of Covid-19
To understand if there is any shift in attitude
in terms of data privacy in times of Covid-
19 as compared to normal circumstances, the
answers to two questions from the third part of the
questionnaire were analysed. The two questions
relate to the participants’ willingness to share
their personal data (data stored on their mobile
device) with the government and relevant insti-
tutions/organizations under normal circumstances
vs. their willingness to do so during this specific
time of pandemic. The results are illustrated in
Figure 3 and are grouped according to Westin’s
classification. Additionally, in order to understand
if the shift in attitude is statistically significant, a
paired t-test was conducted where p − value =
1.0666E − 138. This gives a strong evidence
that the change in attitude towards data sharing
during pandemic as compared with normal cir-
cumstances is statistically significant.
We notice that there is a shift in attitude,
with 61% of the participants indicating that they
Strongly Agree and Agree to share their mobile
data during Covid-19 as compared to 14% before
the pandemic. 55% of the participants changed
their attitude from Strongly Disagree, Disagree
or Neutral to Agree and Strongly Agree. Consid-
ering the sample size of 1001 participants from
a 4.9 million population of Ireland we can state
with a confidence interval of 95% that between
52% and 58% of the entire relevant population
would shift their attitude towards sharing their
mobile data during a pandemic in the interest of
saving lives. In terms of privacy fundamentalists
around 31% (a combined response of Strongly
Agree and Agree) of them would change their
attitude towards mobile data sharing in times of
Covid-19. Previous studies [14] have indicated
that the more aware of privacy threats people
become the higher their feeling of concern, which
makes it more likely for them to be profiled
as privacy fundamentalists, even though their
actions in general might not justify their classi-
fication. Most noticeably and, perhaps, not sur-
prisingly, the highest shift in attitude is recorded
by the privacy unconcerned with a jump of 57%,
followed by privacy fundamentalists and privacy
pragmatists with an increase of 46% and 44%,
respectively.
To better understand the privacy attitude shift,
we asked the participants to indicate what type
of mobile data would they agree to share and
with what organizations or sectors will they be
willing to share this data in order to help defeat
the Covid-19 outbreak. The participants could
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Figure 3. Willingness to share the personal data before and during Covid-19
choose multiple answers for these questions, con-
sequently the highest number of selections was
recorded by anonymized mobile geo-location data
(not exact location, but within a range) followed
by Health status data as listed in Table 1. Table
2 highlights the top organizations or sectors that
the participants would be willing to share their
mobile data with. We notice that out of the
institutions listed, people trust most the HSE and
least the private players involved.
Using the COVID Tracker app
Of all the participants 79% indicated that they
are familiar with the HSE COVID Tracker app
and its role, while 12% are neutral and the rest
of 9% are not familiar. However, only 62% of
the participants indicated that they are using the
COVID Tracker app, with 60% of them finding
the app helpful in controlling the virus. We use
the Pearson’s chi-square test to understand if there
is any association between being familiar with the
app and actually using the app. The test results
revealed a p-value of 1.11521E − 56 indicating
that there is sufficient evidence to conclude that
there is a relationship between the two statements.
Consequently, the participants that are familiar
with the HSE COVID Tracker app and its role
tend to actually use the app as well. Moreover,
regardless of the participants attitude shift during
pandemic, 60% of the participants Strongly Agree
and Agree with the statement that Digital tracking
technologies are important to help control Covid-
Figure 4. HSE COVID-19 Tracker App adoption per
privacy group
19 spread and monitor public health”. Even from
those who are not using the COVID Tracker
app, 35% still agree or strongly agree with this
statement. This indicates that people believe that
digital tracking technologies are useful and could
help control the pandemic.
Figure 4 shows the adoption of the applica-
tion by the three different privacy groups. The
privacy fundamentalist people are the group with
the lowest adoption of the application. This sug-
gests that privacy concerns seem to prevent the
adoption of tracking technology, even in a global
pandemic situation.
Concerns on Privacy
In order to understand people’s concerns on
privacy we requested the participants to indicate
their concern level on a five-point scale from Not
concerned at all to Extremely Concerned when
asked: Would you be concerned in relation to
how your personal data would be used by the
government and the relevant institutions in order
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Table 1. Types of mobile data to be willingly shared by participants
What type of mobile data would you agree to share? Count
Anonymized mobile geo-location data (not exact location, but within a range) 653
Health status data 619
Personal details (name, gender, age) 411
Exact mobile geo-location data 321
Contact list 206
Other 84
Table 2. Organizations or Sectors participants would agree to share their mobile data with
With which of the following would you be willing to share your mobile data? Count
Public Health authorities like HSE 859
Government 482
Public apps sharing anonymized data 366
Private/commercial apps sharing anonymized data 147
Private Health Companies/Agencies 105
Public apps sharing individual data 57
Private/commercial apps sharing individual data 18
Other 54
Figure 5. Concern levels on how the personal data
might be used
to defeat Covid-19?
Our results (Figure 5) indicate that overall
46% of the participants are Not concerned at
all and Slightly Concerned. However, the funda-
mentalists who are the most privacy concerned
group of people prove to be the ones with the
lowest adoption rate of the app among all the
participants. Hence the attitude towards privacy
is an influencing factor in the adoption of the
app. However, looking into the specific concerns
of the participants we ranked them as follows: (1)
privacy issues; (2) lack of trust in the Government
and the institutions managing the data; (3) secu-
rity issues; (4) creating a dangerous precedent;
(5) other. Moreover, only 15% of the partici-
pants would be Extremely concerned if their mo-
bile data would be transferred to other countries
within the EU in order to defeat Covid-19.
The participants that are using or have
used the HSE COVID Tracker app, were also
asked to indicate their concern about what hap-
pens/happened to their information (for example
how long it is retained for) once they quit using
the application or once the pandemic is over.
The results indicate that 42% of the respondents
are concerned about what happens with their
information once they quit using the COVID-19
Tracker app. Moreover, approximately 30% of
the respondents stated that they worried that the
application will be used as a tool of surveillance
beyond the scope of COVID-19. While 28% stated
that they are worried about the implications this
application will have on [my] privacy and data
protection.
Survey Feedback Analysis
All the participants were asked to leave their
comments/feedback on the survey. Out of 1012
participants, we received 202 comments with
most of them being about the COVID tracker ap-
plication. To better understand the comments, we
manually inspected and divided them into three
classes depending upon the degree of underlying
sentiment: (i) negative: if the comment expresses
dissatisfaction, unhappiness, complaint etc.; (ii)
neutral: if the comment is a query, information
etc regardless of any sentiment; and (iii) positive:
if the comment expresses satisfaction, happiness
etc. We observed that more than half (50.71%)
of the comments express negative opinions on
the COVID Tracker application. In contrast, only
13.57% are positive comments about the COVID
Tracker app in terms of data privacy consid-
erations, with one respondent commenting ”I
went through the data policy on the tracker app
and am confident using it in terms of my data
privacy.” [respondent comment] while another
respondent said ”The COVID 19 tracker has been
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well designed with respect to privacy consider-
ations. It is a good model for how such apps
should be developed.”[respondent comment] The
rest 35.71% of the comments are neutral, i.e,
either they are simply providing information or
are queries, regardless of any sentiment.
The feedback from the participants in the
survey unveiled another theme relevant to the
tracking apps in general and COVID Tracker
app in particular: their efficacy. The participants
expressed doubts about the efficacy of the tracker
app with several respondents commenting:
“I use the covid tracker but note that I hear
little about how useful it is thought to have
been - Silence after the initial hype” [respondent
comment]
”I uninstalled the COVID Tracker app as it
did not work when my housemates got COVID,
and it was taking up a lot of storage in my phone.”
[respondent comment]
People are also unhappy about the lack of
communication of conclusive data showing the
efficacy of the app with one respondent comment-
ing:
”Use of tracker system to date in Ireland
UK(?): Real impact / success = ?” [respondent
comment]
The survey results show, that in order to
reinforce the trust in the contact tracing apps and
to stimulate their adoption, the transparent com-
munication of success stories of the apps and data
showing their efficacy is extremely important.
Formal Legality vs. Legal Reality
As seen in Figure 4, 62% of the respondents
confirmed their use of the COVID Tracker app.
However, only 52% of the participants using the
app confirmed that they have read the privacy
policy. Interestingly, 30% feared that the app
could be used as a surveillance tool going beyond
its primary aim to fight the spread of Covid-19
and another 28% stated that they had privacy
concerns regarding the app.
We argue that these data show a discrep-
ancy between formal legality and legal reality,
or, in other words, between what is formally
legal and what is perceived as such. Moreover,
privacy concerns related to the potential misuse
of mobile apps introduced to fight Covid-19 are
not unfounded. For example, in some countries,
contact tracing apps process location data and
have been used by government for general law
enforcement purposes, a circumstance that the
European Data Protection Board in its Guidelines
published in April 2020 has defined as “a grave
intrusion into people’s privacy” [15]. Similar
risks have generated an intense debate in Europe
on the safeguards that contact tracing apps should
guarantee in line with EU fundamental rights. To
this end, last spring, the European Commission,
the European Data Protection Board and the
European eHealth Network adopted detailed sets
of guidance on how to deploy digital technology
solutions in full respect of EU fundamental rights.
In Ireland, the Department of Health and the
HSE successfully demonstrated to comply with
these guidelines in developing and introducing the
COVID Tracker App. Therefore, notwithstanding
the formal legality of the digital solutions imple-
mented in Ireland, the results of the survey show a
significant mistrust in the safeguards the Irish app
is theoretically meant to guarantee. In conclusion,
this image of legal reality in Ireland indicates the
need to reflect on the capability of existing data
protection law to be understood and instill trust
at societal level.
Conclusions
The integration of contact-tracing apps in
emergency responses could represent a dramatic
shift when dealing with public health interven-
tions, such as the current spread of Covid-19.
However, privacy and legal concerns around data
sharing hinder the adoption and consequently the
efficacy of these contact-tracing apps. We have
conducted a study on the privacy attitude in a
time of Covid-19, of the people living in Ireland.
Our results showed that people in Ireland are
aware and protective of their privacy, but there is
a change in their attitude during the pandemic. In
general, people showed an increased willingness
to share their personal data (including location,
contacts, and medical data) in the interest of
saving lives from 14% pre-pandemic to 61%
during pandemic.
Our study shows that enhancing transparency
and data protection literacy is of utmost impor-
tance. Adequate information should be provided
to data subjects in order to express their consent,
even if other legal bases for data processing are
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available. Due to a mistrust of tech companies
by the population, a greater reliance on public
institutions is recommended. Involvement of the
wider population in early phases of decision-
making processes related to the employment of
digital technology solutions to fight Covid-19 is
crucial to enhance the level of legitimacy of the
adopted solutions and as a trigger of greater
transparency of the decision-making processes.
Where public-private partnerships are employed,
all choices affecting data protection and privacy
of individuals should be made in a transparent
manner and highlighted in order to minimise the
discrepancy between formal legality and legal
reality.
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